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Myth,InferenceiandIEvidenceJfTI?x,JFui
Assault Trials

In sexual assault cases, the ability to distinguish myths and stereotypes from
legitimate lines of reasoning continues to be a challenge for Canadian courts. The
author argues that this challenge could be overcome by clearly identj5iingproblematic
inferences in sexual assault cases as prohibited lines of reasoning, while allowing the
defence to bring forward evidence that is logically relevant to the material issues so
long as it does not raise these prohibited inferences.
This paper advances that judges should take a broad view of relevance as an
evidentiary approach in the adjudication of sexual assault cases. This approach
allows for a consideration of circumstances surrounding the alleged assault, which
may include an analysis ofthe nature ofthe interactions between the accused and the
complainant leading up to the alleged assault and in its aftermath. This approach
is necessary in order for the accused to make full answer and defence. However,
common myths and stereotypes about sexual assault are prohibited grounds that the
law has rightly removedfrom legal consideration. The author discusses a number of
these myths, with a special focus on the "twin myths' which the law has rejected:
that the complainant is more likely to have consented, or is less worthy of belief,
given prior sexual activity. Lastly, the author turns to the evidence ofthe perpetrator
and the complainant's relationship subsequent to the alleged assault—where
provincial courts have split in determining what is or is not a prohibited inference
when examining this subsequent relationship.
This paper ultimately argues that the current challenge facing Canadian courts
is ensuring that judges and juries avoid these prohibited lines of reasoning, while
retaining broad access to information about the circumstances and the ability to
draw reasonable, context-specific inferences. Doing so would bring clarity to this
important area of evidence law.

'Osgoode Hall Law School, York University I am grateful to Professors Benjamin Berger,
Richard Haigh, Lisa Kelly and Don Stuart, and to the anonymous peer reviewers, for their
insightful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Michael Ferguson and
Samiyyah Ganga for their excellent research assistance and the editors of the Queen's Law
Journal for their careful work.
Copyright © 2019 by Lisa Dufraimont
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III. Complainant's Subsequent Relationship with the Accused
Conclusion

Some of the most difficult problems in the law on sexual assault are
evidentiary.1 In deciding disputed factual issues in sexual assault cases, challenging
questions persist about what types of evidence are relevant and what inferences
can be drawn from that evidence. For example, what, if anything, can be made
of evidence that the complainant communicated to the accused an intention to
engage in sex with the accused hours before the alleged sexual assault?' What,
if anything, can be made of evidence that the complainant continued to have
an affectionate or sexual relationship with the accused after the alleged sexual
assault?' 'These questions turn on our understanding of relevance. They are also
complicated by the fact that, as L'Heureux-Dubé J recognized almost three
decades ago, sexual assault is an area where common sense judgments about
relevance are frequently infused with stereotypes and myths.4
Canadian law is properly committed to eliminating myths and stereotypes
from the adjudication of sexual assault cases. Rape shield provisions prohibit use
of evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant to raise the discriminatory
inferences that the complainant is less credible or more likely to consent by

1. See generally Susan Estrich, "Teaching Rape Law" (1992) 102:2 Yale LJ 509 (stating that
"society's continued ambivalence towards acquaintance rape is increasingly being expressed in
evidentiary rules and standards of credibility rather than in the definitions of force and consent"
at 519-20).
2. See e.g. R v Ururyar, 2017 ONSC 4428 [UruryarONSC].
3. See e.g. R v Ghomeshi, 2016 ONCJ 155.
4. See R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme, [1991] 2 SCR 577 at 679, 83 DLR (4th) 193, EHeureuxDubé J, dissenting in part [Seaboyer].
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virtue of her sexual experience.' Other stereotypical inferences have been
prohibited in the case law, such as the inferences that a woman who dresses in a
provocative manner invites sexual assault,' and that a lack of resistance amounts
to consent.7 The law's aspiration to eliminate these discriminatory forms of
reasoning remains, of course, imperfectly realized. Scholars have documented
the persistence of myths and stereotypes about sexual assault, demonstrating
that lawyers and judges continue to rely on them with troubling regularity.'
Undoubtedly, more work must be done to remove the influence of stereotypical
reasoning in sexual assault cases.
At the same time, the category of myths and stereotypes is controversial.
Some warn that excessive expansion of this category could threaten the fair
trial rights of the accused by unjustifiably limiting the inferences that may be
drawn from relevant evidence.' Professor Don Stuart put it this way: "[N] or all
assertions of myths and stereotypes are beyond critical scrutiny and fair trial
considerations ....When a judge asserts that something is a myth or false
stereotype, the factual inquiry into relevance is pre-empted and turned into an
indisputable question of law."" On this view, care must be taken to ensure that
efforts to eliminate myths and stereotypes do not result in the inappropriate
rejection of relevant evidence.
This paper takes seriously both the need to remove myths and stereotypes
from the adjudication of sexual assault cases and the importance of ensuring
that the defence can rely on relevant evidence for legitimate purposes. I will
argue that the law requires judges to take a broad view of relevance. In general,
this generous approach to relevance permits consideration of the circumstances
surrounding an alleged sexual assault, including the nature of the interactions
5. See Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, s 276.
6. See e.g. R Cain, 2010 ABCA 371 at para 30.
7. See R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 169 DLR (4th) 193 [cited to SCR]; R v Barton,
2017 ABCA 216 at para 180.
8. See e.g. Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal
Profession (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018) [Craig, Trials on Trial]; Melanie
Randall, "Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and 'Ideal Victims': Consent, Resistance, and Victim
Blaming" (2010) 22:2 CJWI. 397; David M Tanovich, "Regulating Inductive Reasoning in
Sexual Assault Cases" in Benjamin L Berger, Emma Cunliffe & James Stribopolous, eds, To
Ensure That Justice is Done: Essays in Memory of Marc Rosenberg (Toronto: Thomson Reuters,
2017) 73; Janine Benedet, "Probity, Prejudice and the Continuing Misuse of Sexual History
Evidence" (2009) 64 CR (6th) 72 [Benedet, "Sexual History Evidence"].
9. See e.g. David M Paciocco, "Techniques for Eviscerating the Concept of Relevance: A
Reply and Rejoinder to 'Sex with the Accused on Other Occasions: The Evisceration of Rape
Shield Protection" (1995) 33 CR (4th) 365 [Paciocco, "Concept of Relevance"].
10. Don Stuart, Case Comment on R v Schmaltz, (2015) 17 CR (7th) 281 at 281 [Stuart,
Comment on Schmaltz].
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between the accused and the complainant leading up to the alleged assault and
in its aftermath. The accused's constitutional right to make full answer and
defence demands that the defence be permitted to explore the circumstances
surrounding the alleged assault without undue constraint.11 In this context, the
legal disavowal of myths and stereotypes about sexual assault operates to prohibit
use of evidence for particular purposes. Clarity is required in specifying these
prohibited lines of reasoning. This analytical clarity is the key to distinguishing
myths and stereotypes from legitimate inferences.
The analysis will unfold in three parts. First, the concept of relevance will be
discussed, along with the forms of evidence that can be relevant in adjudicating
sexual assault cases. This discussion will show that relevance and admissibility
of evidence are context-dependent and that relevance is not a demanding
threshold. Second, the analysis will turn to myths and stereotypes about sexual
assault. Some of these rejected myths will be identified, and the law's approach
to removing them from the courtroom will be discussed, with special attention
to the legal response to evidence of the complainant's sexual history and
delayed disclosure of sexual assault. The third part of the analysis will focus on
evidence about the complainant's relationship with the perpetrator subsequent
to the alleged assault, which is one area where Canadian courts are currently
grappling with how to distinguish legitimate inferences from prohibited myths.
Ultimately, I will argue, the challenge is to ensure that judges and juries avoid
prohibited lines of reasoning while retaining broad access to information
about the circumstances and the ability to draw reasonable, context-specific
inferences.

I. Relevance in Sexual Assault
This part reviews the law on relevance both in general and in the context
of sexual assault cases specifically. Particular attention will be given to evidence
relevant to consent, which is a central and frequently contested issue in sexual
assault cases.

any tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue" . " The rules of evidence prohibit
certain uses of evidence and lines of reasoning, but beyond this the question
whether evidence has the probative tendency required for relevance is a matter
that is not decided by applying rules of law. Instead, relevance is governed
by logic and human experience: "Relevance
requires a determination of
whether as a matter of human experience and logic the existence of 'Fact A'
makes the existence or non-existence of 'Fact B' more probable than it would
be without the existence of 'Fact A'. If it does then 'Fact A' is relevant to 'Fact
B'."4 To be considered relevant, evidence does not need to be conclusive of
a factual issue or even to reach some less demanding threshold of probative
value.'5 Relevance is a binary question and "any" probative value will do.'6
An example may help to illustrate the expansiveness of this concept.
Imagine a robbery case where the identity of the robber is the disputed issue,
and there is evidence that the accused was in the neighbourhood an hour before
the robbery. Obviously, the evidence is neither determinative of the issue of
identity nor sufficient on its own to prove the issue of identity to any reasonable
standard. The accused may be one of hundreds of people who were in the area.
Nevertheless, the fact that the accused was in the area of the robbery near the
time it occurred makes it more likely that the accused was the robber than it
would be if we did not have this information about the accused's location. The
evidence is therefore relevant on the issue of identity.
Relevance is not a demanding test to meet. Moreover, where reasonable
people disagree about whether evidence is relevant, the law requires that we
"err on the side of inclusi6n".'7 The parties may disagree about whether the
evidence has any logical bearing on the material issues, but where it is arguable
that it does have a legitimate bearing, that evidence passes the test of relevance.
Subject to the rules of evidence, ultimately it will be for the trier of fact to
determine whether the evidence has any probative value in the context of the
case as a whole. Chief Justice Dickson explained in R v Corbett
...

basic principles of the law of evidence embody an inclusionary
policy which would permit into evidence everything logically
probative of some fact in issue, subject to the recognized rules
of exclusion and exceptions thereto. Thereafter the question
is one of weight. The evidence may carry much weight, little

A. The Relevance Requirement Generally
The most fundamental rule of evidence in the common law system is that
only relevant evidence is admissible, and all relevant evidence is admissible
absent a clear reason to exclude it. ' 2 Evidence is considered relevant when "it has
11. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 610-11; Ru Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5 at para 2; R Schmaltz, 2015
ABCA 4 at para 20 [Schmaltz ABCA].
12. See Morris v The Queen, [1983] 2 SCR 190, 1 DLR (4th) 385, Lamer J, dissenting on
other grounds [Morris]; R Grant, 2015 SCC 9 at para 18.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

R Grant, supra note 12.
R Watson (1996), 30 OR (3d) 161 at 177, 50 CR (4th) 245 (CA).
See Morris, supra note 12.
R Grant, supra note 12 at para 18.
Paciocco, "Concept of Relevance", supra note 9 at 367.
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weight, or no weight at all. If error is to be made it should be
on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion.18
The "inclusionary policy" of the law means that evidence should not be excluded
as "irrelevant" where there is a reasonable argument that it has some probative
value for a legitimate inferential purpose.
This inclusionary inclination is particularly appropriate to relevance
determinations made in the course of trials, because the probative value of
any individual piece of evidence must ultimately be determined in relation
to all the other evidence in the case.19 Relevance is therefore inherently
contextual, and categorical prejudgments about it are inappropriate.20 The
law's inclusive attitude toward relevance also has special salience in relation
to defence evidence. The accused has a right to make full answer and defence
under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.21
Canadian courts therefore take great care to ensure that the defence has access
to relevant evidence .22 In the words of McLachlin J (as she then was) writing
for a majority in R v Seaboyer, "to deny a defendant the building blocks of his
defence is often to deny him the defence itself".23
Of course, relevant evidence is not necessarily admissible. Relevant evidence
will be excluded if it is subject to an exclusionary rule or, generally, if the trial
judge concludes that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.24
Prejudice is a complex concept that includes the tendency of the evidence to
create unfairness against the opposing party, to generate confusion or waste time
in the trial, or to invite prohibited lines of reasoning.25 Evidence that supports
18. [1988] 1 SCR 670 at 697, 28 BCLR (2d) 145.
19. See R v Blackman, 2008 SCC 37 at para 30; R v Morin, [1988] 2 SCR 345 at 370, 66
CR (3rd) 1.
20. See Paciocco, "Concept of Relevance", supra note 9.
21. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, ss 7, 11(d), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604;
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 7th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters,
2018) at 222 [Stuart, Charter Justice]
22. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 (recognizing that "Canadian courts, like courts in most common
law jurisdictions, have been extremely cautious in restricting the power of the accused to call
evidence" at 611).
23. Ibid at 614.
24. See R v Grant, supra note 12; Morris, supra note 12; Seaboyer, supra note 4.
25. See R v Grant, supra note 12 (unknown third party suspect evidence carries prejudicial
effect of confusing issues and wasting trial time); R v Corbett, supra note 18 (prejudicial effect
of criminal record evidence flows from tendency to invite prohibited inference from propensity
to guilt).
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a prohibited line of reasoning and has no relevance for any other purpose has
no legitimate probative value and will be inadmissible. As the Supreme Court
of Canada noted in Seaboyer, more difficult issues arise where evidence has
relevance for some permissible purpose but also supports some other, prohibited
line of reasoning.26 In such cases the admissibility of the evidence depends on
the balancing of the probative value of the evidence in relation to its permissible
use against its potential prejudicial effect in terms of its tendency to invite
prohibited reasoning. Because of the special reluctance to exclude evidence
supporting the defence, this balancing is adjusted so that relevant defence
evidence is only excluded where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value.27
While a finding that evidence is relevant is not conclusive of admissibility,
a finding that evidence is irrelevant is conclusive of admissibility. Irrelevant
evidence is automatically inadmissible, and no legitimate inferences can be
drawn from it. Questions inviting irrelevant evidence in response cannot be
asked of witnesses .21 These stark consequences of finding evidence irrelevant,
along with the contextual nature of the relevance inquiry, confirm the wisdom
of the broad view of relevance accepted in Canadian law.
B. Relevance and Consent
The disputed issues in sexual assault cases often include the question
whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity that occurred. This
section considers the evidence that can be relevant to the issue of consent. 'The
analysis will show that, like other disputed issues, consent is an issue susceptible
of proof by both direct and circumstantial evidence.2'

26. See supra note 4 (noting that "the same piece of evidence may have value to the trial
process but bring with it the danger that it may prejudice the fact-finding process on another
issue" at 609).
27. See ibidat6ll.
28. See R v Lyttle, supra note 11 at para 44; R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595, 109 DLR (4th)
478 [cited to SCR] (noting that cross-examination "must conform to the basic principle that all
evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible" at 665).
29. It should be acknowledged that lawyers and judges frequently avoid engaging directly
with the relevance of circumstantial evidence in sexual assault cases by claiming that evidence
of the circumstances is being admitted to go to the "narrative". For recent examples of uses of
this narrative concept in sexual assault cases, see R vJH, 2018 ONCA 245 at paras 33-34; R
v Qhasimy, 2018 ABCA 228 at para 12; R v Shenava, 2017 ONSC 7667 (CanLil) at 14-15;
F v DKN, 2017 ONSC 3890 at paras 67-77. While it may sometimes be necessary in the
course of trials to hear evidence solely for the purpose of establishing a coherent narrative of the
underlying events, the judge must decide whether an item of evidence is relevant to a disputed
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Lack of consent on the part of the complainant is an element of the actus
reus of sexual assault."' Like all elements of the offence, absence of consent
must be proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt before the accused
can be convicted. Consent for the purposes of sexual assault is defined in the
Criminal Code as "the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in
the sexual activity in question"." 'What the Crown must prove, then, is that
the complainant did not voluntarily agree to the sexual activity that is charged
as sexual assault. In the landmark case of R v Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court
of Canada confirmed that consent is a question of the complainant's state of
mind at the time of the sexual activity. 12 Consent is subjective in the sense that
it exists in the mind of the complainant.33 To be effective, consent must also be
contemporaneous with the sexual activity.14
These two features of consent—that it is subjective and contemporaneous—
are central to understanding the offence of sexual assault under Canadian
law. They are part and parcel of a conception of consent that laudably aims
to protect the bodily integrity of sexual assault complainants, who are usually
women, and to prevent sexual exploitation." These two features also sometimes
generate misunderstandings about the evidence that is relevant and probative
on the issue of consent. Subjectivity and contemporaneity are features of the
absence of consent on the facts, which is the object of proof. They are not
requirements limiting the evidence that goes to consent. One might, however,
mistakenly conclude that if consent must be subjective and contemporaneous
then the evidence that goes to consent must share those features.

issue at trial before it can be relied upon directly in deciding the case. The analysis in this paper
therefore focuses on whether evidence is relevant and admissible, and not on whether it might
be admitted as narrative.
30. See v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 at para 25.
31. Supra note 5, s 273.1(1). Some situations where no consent is obtained are listed in
subsections 265(3) and 273.1(2) of the Criminal Code; these include where the complainant
lacks capacity to consent and where consent is vitiated by fraud (ibid, 55 265(3), 273.1(2)).
Subsection 273.1(1.2) of the Criminal Code, which was introduced in December 2018,
provides that "whether no consent is obtained" under these sections is a question of law (ibid,
273.1(1.2)). The effect of this subsection is uncertain, but it will likely make trial findings under
these subsections reviewable on appeal on a standard of correctness.
32. Sec supra note 7 at para 26.
33. See ibid.
34. Sec e.g. R vIA, 2011 SCC 28 at para 46. Parliament recently reaffirmed this principle by
enacting the new subsection 273.1(1.1) of the Criminal Code, which provides: "Consent must
be present at the time the sexual activity in question takes place." Sec supra note 5, s 273.1(1.1).
35. See generally R vIA, supra note 34.
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Consider first the fact that consent is subjective: the object of proof is the
complainant's state of mind. Since consent is subjective, one might think that
a court would be bound to prefer or accept the complainant's "subjective"
testimonial account of her own state of mind, or that evidence relevant to
consent is limited to the complainant's account. To understand why these
intuitions are misguided, it is helpful to consider how mental states are proven
in the criminal law generally. Professor Stuart, Canada's leading scholar on the
subjective/objective distinction in criminal law, 36 explained that for crimes
of subjective fault, "the trier of fact must determine what was actually going
on in the mind of this particular accused at the time in question".37 The law
understands the presence or absence of the requisite state of mind as a fact
about which there is a ground truth and which is susceptible of proof like other
facts.3' The evidence that bears on this question can include direct testimony
from accused persons about their own mental states, but it can also include any
circumstantial evidence that speaks to state of mind. Stuart put it succinctly:
"even where the substantive test is subjective awareness, the approach to proof
is objective".39
These insights about the objective approach to proof of subjective mens rea are
equally applicable to proof of non-consent in cases of sexual assault. The factual
issue to be decided is the complainant's state of mind, but the complainant's
testimony is not determinative because her account of her mental state at the
time (like the evidence of any witness testifying to any factual issue) might be
dishonest or mistaken.4° Just as it is wrong to think that accused persons will
always be acquitted when they deny having had the requisite mens rea,4' it is a
36. Stuart's work is cited in Ewanchuk in support of the proposition that consent is a matter
of "the complainant's subjective internal state of mind". See R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 at para
26. His work is also frequently cited on the broader question of subjective tests in the criminal
law. See R Hundal, [1993] 1 SCR 867, 19 CR (4th) 169 (majority and concurring judgments
citing Stuart on subjective tests); R v Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13 (citing Stuart on wilful blindness as
a subjective state of mind); R Tatton, 2015 SCC 33 (citing Stuart on the specific and general
intent in intoxication).
37. Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 7th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 179
[Stuart, Criminal Law].
38. See ibid at 177
39. Ibid at 176.
40. To acknowledge that sexual assault complainants might, like any witnesses, be dishonest
or mistaken about factual issues is not to endorse the discredited myth that sexual assault
complainants are uniquely likely to be fabricating their accounts. See infra note 71 and
accompanying text. On the other hand, to start from the proposition that complainants must
be believed would run contrary to basic norms of the criminal trial, including the presumption
of innocence. See e.g. R Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 4392 at para 17.
41. See Stuart, Criminal Law, supra note 37 at 176-77.
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mistake to think that non-consent is necessarily established by a complainant's
testimonial claim of non-consent. In both cases the factual issues must be
decided by reference to the whole of the evidence, including any circumstantial
evidence that could undermine witnesses' testimonial claims about their own
states of mind.
In the context of subjective mens rea, relevant circumstantial evidence often
takes the form of evidence about the nature of the accused's acts, which can
give rise to reasonable inferences about what was in the accused's mind. For
example, an accused person who calmly shoots another person in the head will
likely be found to have intended to kill even if the accused denies that intention
on the stand .42 With respect to consent in sexual assault, the defence may point
to evidence of the complainant's acts and communications suggesting that
there was in fact voluntary agreement to engage in the sexual activity; even if
the complainant now says there was no consent. 4' As Professor Stuart observed,
"to determine what was in the complainant's mind, one source of evidence is
the complainant's testimony and another is drawing reasonable inferences from
the complainant's conduct"
The requirement that consent must be contemporaneous with the sexual
activity raises similar issues. The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
a lack of consent at the very time of the sexual activity. But evidence relevant
to this factual question can come from other time periods. The Supreme Court
of Canada clearly recognized this possibility in Ewanchuk: "It is open to the
accused to claim that the complainant's words and actions, before and during
the incident, raise a reasonable doubt against her assertion that she, in her mind,
did not want the sexual touching to take place."" In sum, while consent is
subjective and contemporaneous, evidence going to consent can come from
sources other than the complainant and can be linked to time periods other
than the moment of the alleged assault. The relevance requirement demands
only that the evidence logically support an inference that consent was more or
less likely to have been present at the time of the sexual activity.
While Canadian law on these points is clear, misunderstandings have arisen
in the cases and commentaries. In R v Ururyar, a female complainant testified
that the male accused, an acquaintance, engaged in sexual activity with her,
."

42. See ibid.
43. See e.g. Janine Benedet, "Barton: 'She Knew What She Was Coming For': Sexual Assault,
Prostitution and the Meaning of Consent" (2017) 38 CR (7th) 445 at 449 [Benedet, "Barton"].
44. Don Stuart, "Ewanchuk: Asserting 'No Means No' at the Expense of Fault and
Proportionality Principles" (1999) 22 CR (5th) 39 at 43. See also R v Ewanchuk, supra note
7 (stating that "[w]hile the complainant's testimony is the only source of direct evidence as to
her state of mind, credibility must still be assessed. in light of all the evidence" at para 29).
.

.

45. Supra note 7 at para 29 [emphasis added].
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including intercourse, without her consent.46 The accused testified that the
sexual activity was all consensual. The accused and the complainant met up at a
bar where other friends were also gathered, and later they went to the accused's
apartment, where the sexual activity took place. The evidence included a text
message sent a few hours before the alleged assault from the complainant to the
accused, inviting the accused to the bar and saying, "[c] ome drink and then
we can have hot sex.1147 The trial judge concluded that the text message was
irrelevant, and while his reasons are unclear, they could charitably be interpreted
as suggesting that the text was irrelevant because it was not contemporaneous
with the sexual activity.
As a matter of logic and human experience, however, the fact that the
complainant hours earlier expressed a willingness to engage in consensual
sex with the accused had an obvious bearing on the disputed factual issue of
consent. As a general proposition, the law accepts that a person's expressed
intention to do something at a future time can be evidence that the person went
on to do that thing.48 The text message was not, of course, determinative of
the issue of consent; people do not always follow through with their expressed
intentions, and in the context of sexual touching a complainant is free to
change her mind at any time.4' But relevance does not require that the evidence
be determinative. As a piece of circumstantial evidence that could shed light
on whether the complainant voluntarily agreed in her mind at the time of the
sexual activity, the text message was relevant on the issue of consent.5°
R v Nyznik provides another example of a court appearing to limit evidence
relevant to consent to evidence contemporaneous with the sexual activity.51
The case involved three male police officers accused of sexually assaulting the
female complainant in a hotel room after a night of drinking. The complainant
testified that she did not consent to the sexual activity and that in any event
she was incapacitated by alcohol, drugs administered without her knowledge,
or a combination of the two. The defence claimed that all the sexual activity
was consensual and one of the accused testified to that effect. In the course

46. 2016 ONCJ 448.
47. Ibid at para 52.
48. See R v Starr, 2000 SCC 40 (hearsay exception for statements of present intention
permitting "statements of intent.., to support an inference that the declarant followed through
on the intended course of action, provided it is reasonable on the evidence for the trier of fact
to infer that the declarant did so" at para 169).
49. See R vJA, supra note 34 at Para 40.
50. See Ururyar ONSC, supra note 2. In allowing the appeal against conviction, Dambrot J
reasoned that the text was relevant on the issue of consent because it "was part of the narrative
of the present encounter" and could be understood as an expression of consent (ibid at para 39).
51. See supra note 40.
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case where consent was in issue and evidence was led about whether there
was flirting earlier in the evening between the accused and the complainant,
Professor Craig writes: "Under Canadian law, whether the complainant was
flirting earlier in the evening is irrelevant to the issue of consent. Consent to
sexual touching must be contemporaneous. It must be given at the time of the
sexual contact."57 To the extent that it relies on the timing of the flirting to
argue its irrelevance to consent, this argument seems to confuse a requirement
of the substantive law with an evidentiary requirement. As explained above,
the fact that consent must be contemporaneous does not mean that evidence
relevant to the factual question of consent must also be contemporaneous.
In fairness to Professor Craig, the claim that the earlier flirting was irrelevant
to consent appears defensible on the facts of the case. Schmaltz involved an
allegation that the male accused digitally penetrated the complainant's vagina
while she was asleep, while the accused testified that the sexual activity was
consensual.55 In that factual context, it is difficult to see how any flirtatious
behaviour on the part of the complainant earlier in the evening could have
much logical bearing on the question of consent.59
The discussion and examples above demonstrate that circumstantial evidence
can assist the defence in raising a reasonable doubt on the issue of consent.
Circumstantial evidence can also assist the Crown in proving non-consent.
Indeed, the Crown must rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence to prove
non-consent in cases where complainants are unavailable to testify or for other
reasons cannot recall and communicate their states of mind at the time of the
sexual activity.60 Most often a lack of memory flows from intoxication. In R v
Al-Rawi, for example, a taxi driver was accused of sexually assaulting a woman.61
According to the facts as found by the trial judge, the complainant had been
refused admission into a nightclub because she was intoxicated, and she hailed
the accused's taxi to take her home. Eleven minutes later, a police officer found
the complainant unconscious, naked from the breasts down in the back of the
taxi. The accused had his pants partly undone and was observed trying to hide

of a carefully-reasoned judgment acquitting the accused, Molloy J wrote the
following about the evidence relevant to consent:
To be clear, it does not matter that the complainant appeared
to be interested in Mr. Nyznik. It does not matter that she
was flirting, or kissing Mr. Kara, or that she willingly agreed
to accompany a group of her male workplace colleagues to
a strip bar. It does not matter if she was exchanging sexual
banter with the other two men in the back seat of the cab.
It would not even matter if she proposed going back to the
hotel to have group sex (although I hasten to add that I am
not finding as a fact that she made such a proposition). In
terms of consent, all that matters is what happened at the time of
the activity in question. Did the complainant consent? Or was
she too incapacitated to consent? 'Whatever the complainant
said or did earlier that night does not mean she consented
later.52
To be sure, the factual issue to be decided is whether the complainant
consented at the time of the sexual activity. It is also undoubtedly true that
the complainant's words and actions earlier in the evening "[do] not mean she
consented later", in the sense that they are not determinative of the issue.51
Still, the complainant's words and actions earlier in the evening might be
circumstantial evidence relevant to the disputed issue of consent. It goes too
far to suggest that the complainant's conduct and communications earlier
in the evening "[do] not matter" or are irrelevant simply because they took
place before the sexual touching. 14 This reasoning confuses the substantive rule
that consent must be contemporaneous with the evidentiary requirement of
relevance. Particularly problematic is the suggestion that even if the complainant
had suggested that the group go to the hotel room to have group sex, this fact
would be irrelevant on the issue of consent. In fact, like the text message in
R v Ururyar,55 such an expression of an intention to engage in consensual sex
with the accused would have clear relevance on the issue of consent, because
a person's expressed intentions are relevant to the question whether the person
went on to act in accordance with those intentions.
A similar issue arises in one passage in Professor Elaine Craig's important
new book on sexual assault trials in Canada. In discussing R v Schmaltz,56 a

57. Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8 at 183-84 [footnotes omitted].
58. See ibid; R v Schmaltz, [2015] AJ No 1444 (QL) (Alta Prov Ct).
59. In dissent in Schmaltz ABCA, Paperny JA reasoned that the flirting "does not go to the
Ultimate issue at trial, namely whether the complainant consented to being digitally penetrated
by the appellant". See supra note 11 at para 82. See also Stuart, Comment on Schmaltz, supra
note 10 (stating "it seems likely that any earlier flirting that night had little probative force on
the issue of whether there was consent" at 282). One might even argue that earlier flirting by
the complainant amounted to other sexual activity that should be excluded by the rape shield
provisions, although those provisions are not generally applied to exclude sexual interactions
between the accused and the complainant on the same occasion as the alleged sexual assault.
60. SeeR vAl-Rawi, 2018 NSCA 10 at para 69.
61. See ibid.

52. Ibid at para 138 [emphasis added].
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. See Ururyar ONSC, supra note 2 at para 39.
56. See Schmaltz ABCA, supra note 11.
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the complainant's urine-soaked pants and underwear. 'The complainant did not
know the accused and later had no memory of her interaction with him.
The trial judge found that the accused touched the complainant sexually
when he removed her pants and underwear, but went on to conclude that there
was no evidence on the issue of consent. 12 The trial judge reasoned: "at the
critical time of when Mr. Al Rawi would have stripped the complainant of
her clothes, the Crown has provided absolutely no evidence on the issue of lack
Of consent".61 As in the cases discussed above, here the trial judge mistakenly
reasoned that evidence relevant to consent is limited to the complainant's direct
evidence of non-consent or other evidence contemporaneous with the sexual
touching. In fact, as the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal noted in allowing the
Crown's appeal against the acquittal, in the Al-Rawi case "there was ample
circumstantial evidence that would permit the inference to be drawn that either
the complainant did not voluntarily agree or lacked the capacity to do Sol' .64
That the complainant was on her way home in a taxi, so intoxicated that she
had already urinated in her pants and was unconscious minutes later, surely
provides a strong basis for rejecting the defence claim that the complainant
was capable of, and actually did, consent to sexual activity with a stranger.65
The trial judge's failure to consider this evidence, and his repeated erroneous
assertions that there was no evidence on the issue of consent, amounted to an
error of law demanding appellate intervention.66
C. Context and Circumstances
At the stage of determining relevance, it is appropriate to take a broad view
of the circumstances that may have a bearing on disputed factual issues in sexual
assault cases. Evidence relevant to consent can include circumstantial evidence,
including evidence of "the complainant's words and actions, before and during
the incident" .17 While the focus has been on the issue of consent, circumstantial
evidence can play a similar role in cases that raise issues of mistaken belief in
consent (where the accused's state of mind is at issue) or where the occurrence of
the sexual activity itself is disputed. In general, subject to the rules of evidence
and the prohibited lines of reasoning that will be discussed in the next section,

both the Crown and the defence should be afforded the opportunity to bring
evidence of the circumstances of the alleged assault that may assist the trier of
fact in making reasonable findings of fact.

ilill
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Assessing relevance requires judges and juries to interpret the meaning
and value of evidence, including evidence of human behavior, in light of their
understanding and experience. This open-ended inquiry creates space for the
operation of biases and misconceptions, especially in the area of sexual assault.
As L'Heureux-Dubé J observed in Seaboyer, determinations of relevance are
"particularly vulnerable to the application of private beliefs [because they are]
filled by the particular judge's experience, common sense and/or logic"."
Sexual assault, she further explained, is one domain where "experience, common
sense and logic are informed by stereotype and myth"." The Supreme Court
of Canada has subsequently acknowledged that myths and stereotypes about
sexual assault have operated to unfairly discredit complainants in cases of sexual
assault and abuse.7°
This part explores how these myths have operated in our law and the
efforts that have been made to eliminate them from the adjudication of sexual
assault cases. After identifying a number of forms of reasoning that have been
rejected, the analysis will focus on the law's response to the discriminatory uses
of evidence of the complainant's sexual history and delayed complaint. This
part will conclude with suggestions for a general approach courts might take
in trying to avoid stereotypical and discriminatory reasoning. I will argue that
myths and stereotypes about sexual assault are properly understood as prohibited

68. Supra note 4 at 679.
69. Ibid.
70. See e.g. R v Find, 2001 SCC 32. 'The unanimous Court held that
complainants are particularly invidious
myths and stereotypes about
because they comprise part of the fabric of social 'common sense in which
we are daily immersed. Their pervasiveness, and the subtlety of their
operation, create the risk that victims of abuse will be blamed or unjustly
discredited in the minds of both judges and jurors.
.

62. See ibid. The trial judge repeatedly and clearly expressed the view that there was no
evidence of a lack of consent at the relevant time (ibid at paras 89, 92).
63. Ibid at para 93 [emphasis in original] (quoting from the trial judge's reasons).
64. Ibid at para 94.
65. For further discussion, see Elaine Craig, "Judging Sexual Assault Trials: Systemic Failure in
the Case of Regina v Bassam Al-Rawi" (2017) 95:1 Can Bar Rev 179.
66. See vAl-Rawi, supra note 60 at para 103.
67. R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 at para 29.
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Ibid at pars 103. See also R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668, 180 DLR (4th) 1 [cited to SCR]. The
majority noted that "speculative myths, stereotypes, and generalized assumptions about sexual
have too often in the past hindered the search for truth and imposed harsh
assault victims
and irrelevant burdens on complainants in prosecutions of sexual offences" (ibid at para 119).
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inferences, and that the law can and should manage the distinction between
prohibited and legitimate inferences by defining clearly the lines of reasoning
that are forbidden.
A. Some Recognized Myths
In Canadian legal discourse, the phrase "myths and stereotypes" refers
to false beliefs about sexual assault that distort the fact-finding process.71
Sometimes these beliefs are false in the factual sense that they do not match
the known realities of sexual assault as a social phenomenon. The beliefs that
sexual assault complainants are uniquely likely to be lying,72 and that rapists are
usually strangers to their victims,73 fall into this category. Other sexual assault
myths involve misconceptions about the law and legal responsibility; such as the
beliefs that non-consent must be demonstrated through physical resistance,74
that a complainant's consent can be implied from the circumstances even in
the absence of voluntary agreement in the complainant's mind,75 and that a
complainant's testimonial account must be corroborated by independent
evidence before guilt can be proven .71 It is difficult to know how widely-held
71. See R Find, supra note 70 at paras 101-03; R v Mills, supra note 70 at para 119.
72. See Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8 (discussing the history and tenacity of the idea
that "false rape allegations are prevalent" at 95); Robyn Doolittle, "Unfounded: Why Police
Dismiss 1 in 5 Sexual Assault Claims as Baseless", The Globe and Mail (3 February 2017),
online: <theglobeandmail.com/news/investigationslunfounded-sexual-assault-canada-msin/
artic1e33891309> (documenting widespread disbelief of sexual assault complainants by
Canadian police).
73. See Seaboyer, supra note 4, L'Heuteux-Dubé J, dissenting in part (noting reliance on
stereotypes to discredit sexual assault complainants, including the stereotype of the "[riapist
as a [s]tranger" at 652-53); Statistics Canada, Self-Reported Sexual Assault in Canada, 2014, by
Shana Conroy & Adam Cotter, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 11 July
2017) (great majority of sexual assaults perpetrated by friend, acquaintance, neighbour, family
member or spouse).
74. See e.g. R v Barton, supra note 7 (tenacity of "ghost element' of victim resistance" in sexual
assault at para 156).
75. See R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 (trial judge erred in relying on spurious defence of "implied
consent" and concluding that complainant's conduct amounted to consent even though she did
not consent in her mind at para 31).
76. The former requirement that the complainant's testimony be corroborated was abrogated
by the enactment of what is now section 274 of the Criminal Code, which provides that, for
sexual offences, "no corroboration is required for a conviction and the judge shall not instruct
the jury that it is unsafe to find the accused guilty in the absence of corroboration." See supra
note 5, s 274.
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are these beliefs in Canadian society; but the Supreme Court of Canada has
accepted that such myths are common enough that they can and do distort the
adjudication of sexual assault cases.77
Regrettably, Canadian case law furnishes many examples of lawyers and
judges endorsing these misconceptions. 71 For example, in R v SB, the Court of
Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador determined that the trial judge erred in
permitting defence counsel to lead evidence of the complainant's sexual history
that depicted her as promiscuous and led to her "gratuitous humiliation and
denigration".79 The most notorious recent example is that of then Camp J,
whose egregious conduct in the 2014 trial in R v Wagar°—which included
his asking a sexual assault complainant why she could not just keep her knees
together to ward off the sexual assault—led the Canadian Judicial Council to
recommend his removal from the bench.81
While it would be difficult to compile an exhaustive list, and there has been
no attempt to do so here, numerous myths and stereotypes have been recognized
in Canadian law and can be readily identified. The two most notorious surround
complainants, usually women, who have previously engaged in sexual activity.
These discriminatory inferences are known as the "twin myths"82 and they hold
that:
i.
ii.

a complainant's sexual experience makes it more likely that she
consented on the occasion in question; and
a complainant's sexual experience undermines her credibility as a
witness 83

Other discriminatory beliefs about sexual assault complainants include:
i.

a woman who dresses in a sexually appealing or provocative manner
lacks credibility or is responsible if she is sexually assaulted;84 and

77. See R v Find, supra note 70 (where the court discussed the "prevailing existence of such
myths and stereotypes" at para 101).
78. For sources citing many examples of such mythical and stereotypical reasoning in recent
Canadian trials, see Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8; Randall, supra note 8; Tanovich, supra
note 8; Benedet, "Sexual History Evidence", supra note 8.
79. 2016 NLCA 20 at paras 60, 43, rev'd on other grounds 2017 SCC 16.
80. (2014) CarswellAlta 2756 (Alta Prov Ct).
81. See Canadian Judicial Council Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honourable Robin Camp:
Report to the Minister ofJustice (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 2017). Justice Camp later
resigned.
82. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604.
83. See ibid; R v Darrach, 2000 SCC 46 at para 2.
84. See e.g. R v Cain, supra note 6 ("long-discredited myths and stereotypes about women
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ii.

consultation with a mental health professional, in itself, indicates that
a complainant is not a reliable witness.85

Some myths surround what constitutes consent, including:
i.
ii.

a lack of verbal objection constitutes consent;86 and
a lack of physical resistance constitutes consent.87

Finally, the law rejects a number of common but unrealistic expectations about
how people who have experienced sexual assault behave, including:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

a real victim of sexual assault will resist physically;"
by virtue of having resisted physically, a real victim will be physically
injured;89
a real victim will immediately report the assault to police;" and
a real victim will thereafter avoid the perpetrator.91

Each of these misconceptions has been recognized as an inference from evidence
that is capable of distorting the fact-finding process in sexual assault trials.
B. Two Key Examples
To understand how the law seeks to remove these myths and stereotypes, it
will be useful to consider more closely two forms of evidence: the complainant's
sexual history and delayed complaint. These two forms of evidence have much
in common. In both cases, certain inferences from the evidence that are now
rejected as stereotypes were once endorsed by the common law. Both areas
have seen statutory reform aimed at rejecting these stereotypes, followed by
developments in the case law. Examination of how these forms of evidence
are regulated in Canadian law will yield insights into the greater project of
removing myths and stereotypes from the adjudication of sexual assault cases.
deserving to be raped because they dress provocatively" at Para 30).
85. See e.g. RvMil1s, supra note 70 at Para 119.
86. See e.g. R v Ewanchuk, supra note 7 ("that silence, passivity or ambiguous conduct
constitutes consent is a mistake of law" at Para 51).
87. See e.g. R v Barton, supra note 7 ("historical tendency to treat a complainant's silence, nonresistance or submission as 'implied consent" at Para 180 [emphasis in original]).
88. See ibid; Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 651-52.
89. See e.g. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 660.
90. Sec e.g. R v W(R), [1992] 2 SCR 122 at 136, 13 CR (4th) 257.
91. See e.g. R v Caesar, 2015 NWTCA 4 at Para 6.
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(i) Complainant's Sexual History

Historically, the common law permitted a rape complainant to be crossexamined about her sexual reputation and her prior sexual acts with the accused
and others.92 These matters were understood as relevant to the complainant's
credibility as a witness because the common law viewed "unchaste" women as
less worthy of belief.93 The complainant's sexual reputation and sexual history
with the accused were also seen as relevant to consent because "unchaste" women
were viewed as more likely to consent generally94 and having consented to sex
with the accused in the past was thought to suggest consent on the occasion in
question.95 The common law's assumptions about women, and particularly the
"twin myths" that sexually experienced women are more likely to consent and
less worthy of belief, are obviously offensive. More than a quarter century ago,
the Supreme Court of Canada proclaimed these twin myths "discredited".96
Legislative attempts to combat these stereotypes have come in the form
of rape shield laws. An early version of Canada's rape shield provisions came
into force in 1983, restricting cross-examination and other evidence on the
complainant's sexual activity on other occasions. The 1983 law made evidence
of the complainant's sexual reputation inadmissible to go to credibility, and also
excluded all evidence of the complainant's sexual activity with anyone other
than the accused, with three stipulated exceptions.97 In Seaboyer, the Supreme
Court of Canada struck down section 276 of the Criminal Code, which
demanded "blanket exclusion" of sexual history evidence that did not fit within
the exceptions.98 By a majority, the Court held that the legislated exceptions

92. See Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604; R v Krausz (1973), 57 Cr App R 466 at 472 (CA (Eng));
Ronald Joseph Delisle et al, Evidence: Principles and Problems, 12th ed (Toronto: Thomson
Reuters, 2018) at 296-97.
93. In Seaboyer, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that historically the common
law accepted "that unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event,
were less worthy of belief". See supra note 4 at 604.
94.Ibid.

95. See Delisle et al, supra note 92 at 296-97.
96. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 604.
97. See Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, ss 246.6-246.7, as amended by An Act to amend
the Criminal Code in relation to sexual offences and other offences against the person and to amend
certain otherActs in relation thereto or in consequence thereof SC 1980-81-82-83, c 125, s 19. At
the time these provisions were struck down in Seaboyer, they had been renumbered as sections
276 and 277. See Criminal Code, supra note 5, ss 276-77, as it appeared on 14 August 1992
(other sexual activity and reputation evidence, respectively).
98. Supra note 4at6l3.
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were insufficient because there were other situations where the complainal
sexual history would be relevant and probative for the defence without relying
on myths or stereotypes.99 Blanket exclusion of sexual history evidence violated
the accused's Charter right to a fair trial by excluding evidence potentially "of
critical relevance to the defence".'°°
Following Seaboyer, Parliament amended the rape shield provisions to
comply with the Charter. The version of section 276 that was adopted at that
time remains largely in force today. Parliament passed some amendments to
the section in December 2018,101 but for the most part these amendments
do not appear to change the legal tests for admissibility of evidence of the
complainant's sexual history. One key provision that has remained constant
since 1992 is subsection 276(1), which provides that in sexual offence cases:

(b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and [sic]
(c) is of specific instances of sexual activity; and
(d) has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the
proper administration of justice.103
The first condition of admissibility—that the evidence is not being adduced to
support the twin myths prohibited in subsection 276(1)—was added in 2018.
This addition does not appear to change the effect of the provision, since twin
myths reasoning was already, and remains, prohibited by subsection 276(1).
The last major component of the analysis is subsection 276(3), which
like subsection 276(1) was unaffected by the recent amendments. Subsection
276(3) lays out a number of factors judges are required to take into account
in determining the admissibility of such evidence. These factors include the
accused's right to make full answer and defence, the complainant's dignity
and privacy, the need to remove discriminatory biases from fact-finding, and
society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault.104 The broad
range of factors to be considered in the admissibility decision reflects a legislative
intention not only to eliminate prohibited forms of reasoning based on sexual
history but also to prevent the use of sexual history evidence to harass, demean
or intimidate sexual assault complainants.
Finally, the 2018 amendments added a new subsection, 276(4), which
provides: "For the purpose of this section, sexual activity includes any
communication made for a sexual purpose or whose content is of a sexual
nature." 101 This new subsection seems likely to present courts with interpretive
challenges. For example, should it be read to apply to communications from the
complainant to the accused that could indicate consent? Would it, for example,
cover the "[c] ome drink and then we can have hot sex" text message that was
sent by the complainant to the accused a few hours before the alleged sexual
assault in Ururyar,'°6 as discussed above?117 One might argue that the rape shield
provisions should not apply to such communications between the complainant
and the accused because, provided that they take place on the same occasion as
the alleged sexual assault, they are not "other" sexual activity but rather are part
and parcel of "the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge" . "'
Alternatively, one might conclude that the rape shield provisions do apply to
such communications, and that their admissibility must be determined under

276(1)
evidence that the complainant has engaged in
sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other
person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by
reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant
(a)is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity
that forms the subject-matter of the charge; or
(b) is less worthy of belief.112
.

.

.

Subsection 276(1) operates to prohibit entirely the admission of evidence of the
complainant's other sexual activity to support the twin myths.
Next, subsection 276(2) makes sexual history evidence generally inadmissible
but allows for its admission when four conditions of admissibility are met. That
subsection was amended in 2018 and currently provides that in sexual offence
cases:
276(2)
evidence shall not be adduced by or on behalf
of the accused that the complainant has engaged in sexual
activity other than the sexual activity that forms the subjectmatter of the charge, whether with the accused or with any
other person, unless
the evidence
(a) is not being adduced for the purpose of supporting
an inference described in subsection (1);
.

.

.

.

.

.

99. See ibid (stating that "jurisprudence affords numerous examples of evidence of sexual conduct which would he excluded by s. 276 but which clearly should be received in the interests of a
fair trial").
100. Ibid at616.
101. See An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department ofJustice Act and to make
consequential amendments to another Act, SC 2018, c 29.
102. Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 276(1).
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103. Ibid,s276(2).
104. See ibid. s276(3).
105. Ibid, s 276(4) [emphasis in original].
106. Ururyar ONSC, supra note 2 at para 37.
107. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
108. Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 276(2).
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subsection 276(2) by weighing their legitimate probative value on issues
including consent against their prejudicial effect, including their tendency, if
any, to invite twin myths reasoning.
An even more difficult and long-standing problem of interpretation is to
determine exactly what subsection 276(1) prohibits. Early on, some read the
legislation broadly to prohibit all use of sexual history evidence to go to consent
and credibility, a construction that raised Charter concerns because it seemed
to recreate the kind of blanket exclusion criticized in Seaboyer.'°9 This broad
construction has not been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. In R v
Crosby, for example, the Court ruled evidence of the complainant's prior sexual
encounter with the accused admissible because it was bound up with a prior
inconsistent statement that shed light on her credibility."' In R v Darrach, the
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously upheld the constitutionality of section
276, finding that it does not constitute an impermissible "blanket exclusion"."'
The Court held that subsection 276(1) only prohibits admission of evidence to
112 Prohibiting
support "two specific, illegitimate inferences": the twin myths.
under
admission
preclude
the
'I
does
not
generalizations"'
these "discriminatory
subsection 276(2) of sexual history evidence to support non-discriminatory
inferences, even on the issues of consent and credibility. These permissible,
non-discriminatory inferences could include "evidence of sexual activity.
proffered for its non-sexual features, such as to show a pattern of conduct or a
prior inconsistent statement" h14
The most troubling questions regarding the scope of the twin myths
surround the use of evidence of prior sexual activity between the accused and
the complainant. The previous version of section 276 struck down in Seaboyer
applied only to evidence of the complainant's sexual activity with persons other
than the accused. In laying out common law guidelines governing admissibility
of sexual history in Seaboyer, McLachlin J wrote, "I question whether evidence
of other sexual conduct with the accused should automatically be admissible
in all cases; sometimes the value of such evidence might be little or none.""'
When Parliament enacted the new section 276 shortly thereafter, it accepted
the Court's invitation and made the rape shield provisions equally applicable

to sexual activity with the accused and with others. This extension of the rape
shield provisions has been controversial. Professor Stuart has consistently taken
the position that "Canada's rape shield protection should not apply equally to
prior sexual history with the accused."116
Arguably, however, the time to question whether sexual activity with the
accused should be covered by the rape shield provisions has passed. Justice
McLachlin's observation that such evidence often has little or no value has
proven true. For example, in R v JSS, the defence sought to lead evidence of
numerous details of the prior sexual relationship between the accused and
the complainant, including the use of sex toys and acts of intercourse during
menstruation.' 7 The trial judge excluded most of the evidence as irrelevant
and inviting only the "discredited myths that a woman who enjoys sex must
therefore have consented on these occasions, or is inherently less believable
because of her supposedly loose morals"." As Professor Craig has pointed
out, the effect of this evidence was to portray the complainant "as 'the type of
woman' who would consent to anything"."' To the extent that it operates to
exclude evidence tendered for such purposes, the extension of the rape shield
provisions to cover sexual activity with the accused appears easily defensible.
Since section 276 does apply to sexual activity with the accused, the
challenge is to understand precisely the inferences the provisions prohibit.
Clarity on this point has proven elusive, especially when it comes to inferences
about consent where the evidence relates to other consensual sexual activity
between the complainant and the accused. 121 One reading of the provisions
is that, regardless of the factual circumstances, the twin myths prohibition
rules out any inference that the complainant's having consented to sexual
activity with the accused on some other occasion makes it more likely that the
complainant consented on the occasion in question. 121 This broad reading of
the twin myths is arguably available on the language of subsection 276(1), but
it brushes close to the proposition rejected in Darrach that subsection 276(1) is
a blanket exclusion of sexual history evidence going to consent.122

116. Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 281.
117. 2014 BCSC 804 at para 9.
109. See e.g. RJ Delisle, "Potential Charter Challenges to the New Rape Shield Law" (1992)
13 CR (4th) 390. See also David M Paciocco, "The New Rape Shield Provisions in Section 276
Should Survive Charter Challenge" (1993) 21 CR (4th) 223 [Paciocco, "New Rape Shield"].
110. [199512 SCR 912,141 NSR(2d) 101.
111. Supra note 83 at para 32.
112.Ibid.

.

113. Ibid at para 34.
114. Ibid at para 35.
115.Supra note 4 at 633.
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118. Ibid at para 31.
119. Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8 at 51.
120. See Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 280.
121. This broad reading of subsection 276(1) has been advanced, for example, by Professor
Janine Benedet, who has argued that the inference "that consent to activity on a prior occasion
makes it more likely on a subsequent occasion
is an impermissible inference that cannot be
saved by resort to the balancing factors
this evidence is deemed inadmissible by the Code".
See Benedet, "Barton", supra note 43 at 447.
122. See v Darrach, supra note 83 at para 32.
.
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An alternative view holds that the twin myths categorically prohibited
by subsection 276(1) are the bad character inferences that the complainant's
sexual history makes her "the type to consent, or the type who should not be
believed".123 Professor David Paciocco, now Justice of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario, advanced this view of the twin myths soon after the adoption of the
new section 276 in 1992, and Darrach has been read as an affirmation of this
124
more limited reading of the section. This understanding of the twin myths
prohibition is grounded on a reading of subsection 276(1) that emphasizes
the statutory limitation that the inferences prohibited are those that suggest
that increased likelihood of consent or decreased credibility flow "by reason of
125 This narrower view also maps on to the
the sexual nature of that activity"
historical use of sexual history as a form of bad character evidence targeting
women, which is the context in which twin myths reasoning was defined and
rejected.'26
Canadian courts remain divided over the scope of the twin myths prohibited
by subsection 276(1).127 Ontario courts have often defined the twin myths
narrowly. In R v Strickland, HeeneyJ admitted evidence of the existence of a prior
sexual relationship between the accused and the complainant. 121 The evidence
was relevant on the disputed issue of consent because it is "at least somewhat
more probable that a complainant would consent to having sex with a man with
whom she had an existing sexual relationship, than if no such relationship existed
at all" .121 The prior sexual relationship was admissible to show an increased
likelihood that the complainant consented, Heeney J reasoned, but not in a
manner prohibited by section 276.11 The jury would be misled if evidence
of the ongoing sexual relationship were excluded, and admitting the evidence
provided context to "dispel the inference of the unlikelihood of consent" that
would arise from leaving the jury with the impression that the alleged sexual

assault occurred between strangers or people with no prior relationship.131 This
reasoning from Strickland has been followed in Ontario and elsewhere.132
An opposing view emerges from the Court of Appeal of Alberta. Recently
in R v Goldfinch, that Court held that Strickland is not good law in Alberta."'
Goldfinch involved an allegation of non-consensual sex between a male accused
and a female complainant. The two had lived together for several months, after
which the complainant ended the relationship. Subsequently, the two remained
friendly and still saw each other, and occasionally they met for sex. The defence
tendered evidence of the fact of the sexual relationship between the accused and
the complainant that was ongoing at the time of the alleged offence. The Crown
opposed admission of this evidence, and offered to concede by way of context
"that the parties had had a prior relationship where they had lived together but
that they had broken up and 'remained friends', that the complainant would
come over to the respondent's place on occasion and would sleep over, and that
the parties remained on good terms". 114 Relying on Strickland, the trial judge
admitted the evidence of the ongoing sexual relationship. The jury acquitted
the accused and the Crown appealed. In setting aside the acquittal, the majority
of the Court of Appeal of Alberta held that the only purpose for admitting the
evidence was to support one of the twin myths: "namely that the complainant
was more likely to have consented to sexual activity on the occasion in question
because she had consented in the past"."'
The Court of Appeal of Alberta took a similarly broad view of the twin myths
prohibition in subsection 276(1) in R v Barton. 116 In that complex, horrific and
tragic case, the accused agreed to pay a woman for sex and then inflicted a fatal
injury on her in the course of sexual activity.137 The defence acknowledged
131. Ibid at paras 34-35. This reasoning was relied upon by Berger in dissent in R v Goldfinch.
See 2018 ABCA 240.
132. See v Provo, 2018 ONCJ 474; R WJA, 2010 YKTC 108 at para 34; R Field, 2010
YKSC 11 atparas 2, 4.

123. Paciocco, "New Rape Shield", supra note 109 at 226.
124. See Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 278-79; RJ Delisle, "Adoption, Sub-silentio,
of the Paciocco Solution to Rape Shield Laws" (2001) 36 CR (5th) 254.
125. Paciocco, "New Rape Shield", supra note 109 at 233.
126. See Seaboyer, supra note 4. The Court identified the "twin myths" as "the myths that
unchaste women were more likely to consent to intercourse and in any event, were less worthy of
belief" (ibid at 604).
127. See Stuart, Charter Justice, supra note 21 at 280.
128. (2007), 45 CR (6th) 183, 2007 CanLil 3679 (Ont Sup Ct).
129. Ibidatpara28.
130. See ibid at para 24.
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133. R Goldfinch, supra note 131 at para 3l.
134. Ibidarpara7.
135. Ibid at para 46. For commentary supportive of the majority analysis in Goldfinch, see
Hamish Stewart, Sexual Offences in Canadian Law (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) (looseleaf updated 2018, release 32) at 8-16.1.
136. Supra note 7.
137. Barton was charged with first degree murder after Cindy Gladue died from an 11 cm
perforation to her vaginal wall. The Crown's principal theory was that he intentionally cut
her vaginal wall with a sharp object. The defence admitted that the accused inflicted the fatal
injury in the course of sexual activity, but claimed that the injury was the accidental result
of consensual digital penetration. The Crown's secondary theory was that even if the injury
was caused by digital penetration of Gladue's vagina, the accused was guilty of manslaughter
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that while the accused and the deceased, Cindy Gladue, agreed on a price in
advance of the sexual activity; the accused did not actually pay Gladue for
her sexual services on the night of her death. The Court of Appeal of Alberta
determined that, in deciding whether the deceased consented to the accused's
digital penetration of her vagina that night, it was irrelevant in law that he
paid her the same agreed price for sex the night before and that similar sexual
activity occurred.138 Understanding how the rape shield provisions apply on the
facts of Barton is complicated by the fact that, at trial, those provisions were
never applied; evidence of the previous sexual activity between the accused and
the complainant was improperly admitted without objection from the Crown
and without any application or analysis under section 276.139 The Court was
Clear, however, in holding that subsection 276(1) made the evidence of the
prior sexual interaction categorically irrelevant and inadmissible on the issue of
consent. 140 The Court held that under subsection 276(1), "evidence of consent
to sexual activity between a complainant and an accused on a prior occasion is
I rrelevant to whether the complainant consented at the time in question."41
This broad view of the twin myths prohibition may raise trial fairness
concerns. Disputed factual issues including consent should generally be decided
on the basis of all the evidence, including any circumstantial evidence, that has a
legitimate logical bearing on those issues. Adjudicating the case in Goldfinch on
the basis that the parties were "friends" when they were in fact regularly having
sex arguably means deciding the case on a fictitious set of facts more favourable
to the Crown than the actual circumstances. In Barton, there was clearly a danger
that the jury might draw discriminatory inferences about Gladue's character as
an Indigenous woman who was intoxicated and involved in sex work; those
inferences would be impermissible on any reasonable understanding of the
rape shield provisions.112 But quite apart from those prejudicial bad character

inferences, the evidence that the deceased agreed to sell her sexual services to the
same man, in the same location, for the same price, on two consecutive nights
could logically support an inference that she may, in her mind, have consented
on the second night to the kind of digital penetration that occurred on the first
night. 141 This inference is arguably not prohibited by subsection 276(1) because
it flows from the commercial nature of the parties' interactions and not, as
required by subsection 276(1), "by reason of the sexual nature" of the prior
sexual activity.144 In Barton there were also circumstantial factors favouring the
Crown's position that there was no consent to the digital penetration on the
second night, including the fact that the accused admitted to using more force
on the second night and the level of violent force that would have been required
to cause the fatal injury. 145 However, the existence of circumstantial evidence
favouring the Crown cannot justify dismissing circumstantial evidence that
favours the defence as irrelevant.
The exclusion under subsection 276(1) of the prior sexual history evidence
in Goldfinch and Barton fits uneasily with the Supreme Court of Canada's
conclusions that "s. 276(1) is an evidentiary rule that only excludes material that
is not relevant" '146 and that a total ban on twin myths reasoning is acceptable
because such reasoning is inherently discriminatory and has "no place in a
rational and just system of law". '47 One might, of course, understand these
conclusions as a rule of constructive irrelevance, such that evidence is deemed
irrelevant and discriminatory because it fits within the language of subsection
276(1), broadly construed. 14' However, one of the main messages of Seaboyer is
that the defence is generally entitled to rely on factually relevant evidence, and
factual relevance cannot be negated by legislative or judicial fiat. I would argue
that the Supreme Court of Canada's strong language in Seaboyer and Darrach
about the discriminatory character and blanket irrelevance of twin myths
reasoning should be understood to limit the kinds of inferences that merit
being placed in that category. On this view, an interpretation of subsection

because he caused her death by the unlawful act of sexual assault. This theory put in issue
whether Gladue consented to the accused's digital penetration of her vagina on the night of her
death. See R v Barton, supra note 7.
138. See ibid at paras 211-12. See also Benedet, "Barton", supra note 43 at 447.
139. The trial judge's failure to apply section 276 to the admission of this evidence was one of
the legal errors that necessitated a new trial.
140. See v Barton, supra note 7. See the section of the judgement entitled "Evidence of Prior
Sexual Conduct Inadmissible Regarding Gladue's Consent" (ibid at paras 143-52). The Court
explicitly left open the possibility that the evidence could be admissible to support a defence of
mistaken belief in consent (ibid at para 149, n 67).
141. Aid at Para 149 [emphasis in original].
142. See supra note 7. As the Court of Appeal of Alberta rightly pointed out, the potential for
discriminatory reasoning about the propensity to consent and general worthiness of the deceased

and women like her was high (ibid at Para 128). It was incumbent on the trial judge to warn the
jury against these discriminatory forms of reasoning (ibid at paras 161-62).
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143. See Don Stuart, "Barton: Sexual Assault Trials Must be Fair not Fixed" (2017) 38 CR
(7th) 438 (noting that "on the issue of whether the complainant actually consented to sexual
conduct including the violent listing on the second night it was surely relevant that she might
have consented to listing the night before?" at 441).
144. Criminal Code, supra note 5, s276(1).
145. See supra note 7 at paras 144, 195.
146. R v Darrach, supra note 83 at Para 37.
147. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 630.
148. This appears to be the effect of the reasoning in Barton, which distinguishes factual
relevance from legal relevance and suggests that subsection 276(1) makes evidence legally
irrelevant. See supra note 7 at Para 146.
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276(1) that excludes evidence that is factually relevant for non-discriminatory
inferential purposes is an interpretation of subsection 276(1) that is overbroad.
It is well to remember that evidence of the complainant's sexual history that
is not excluded under subsection 276(1) is not necessarily admissible. Rather,
the admissibility of such evidence falls to be decided on the criteria outlined
in subsection 276(2), including the balancing of probative value against
prejudicial effect. Arguably, that balancing exercise is the central feature of the
rape shield regime and most contested admissibility questions should be decided
at that stage. Adopting a broad interpretation of twin myths reasoning under
subsection 276(1) risks excluding relevant evidence without fully considering
either its potential probative value or the extent of its prejudicial effect.
In any event, Alberta law clearly takes a broad view of the twin myths that
are prohibited absolutely by subsection 276(1), while Ontario courts have
tended to take a narrower view. The language of the Criminal Code appears
flexible enough to support either of these views. Both Barton and Goldfinch
have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, so there is reason to hope
that clarification on this point will be forthcoming. Whatever interpretation
is ultimately adopted, clarity on the scope of the twin myths will improve the
state of the law.
(ii) Delayed Disclosure
Like the complainant's sexual history, delayed reporting of sexual
victimization was the subject of problematic assumptions at common law.'49
The law upheld an expectation that a true victim would immediately report the
offence to authorities."' Consequently, delays in reporting were understood to
suggest a false allegation."' This assumption grounded the common law doctrine
of recent complaint, which comprised two rules. First, despite the general rule
against prior consistent statements and without the defence raising the issue of
delay, the prosecution was entitled to lead evidence of any prompt report of a
sexual offence to rebut the adverse inference that was thought to flow naturally
from delayed reporting. 112 Second, when reporting was delayed, judges were
149. For a detailed discussion, see Elaine Craig, "The Relevance of Delayed Disclosure to
Complainant Credibility in Cases of Sexual Offence" (2011) 36:2 Queen's LJ 551 [Craig,
"Delayed Disclosure"]
150. See Kribs et ci v The Queen, [1960] SCR 400, 33 CR 57 [Kribs cited to SCR]
that she is expected to complain upon the first reasonable opportunity, and
("presumptions
that if she fails to do so, her silence may naturally be taken as a virtual self-contradiction of
her story" at 405).
151. See ibid; Re Boyce (1975), 7 OR (2d) 561 at 577, 28 CR (NS) 336 (CA).
...

152. See R vBoyce, supra note 151.
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required to instruct juries that they could draw an adverse inference against the
complainant.113
We now know that most sexual assault victims never report the experience
to police, and that many others delay in reporting. 114 The common law
premises that a complainant's immediate reporting was "normal" and "natural"
and delayed reporting was "a virtual self-contradiction of her story"" are on
their face invalid and discriminatory. Consequently, in 1983, the doctrine of
recent complaint was expressly abrogated by an amendment to the Criminal
Code.'56 This statutory reform clearly repudiated the myth that real victims
report immediately, and it abrogated the two rules above: the prosecution can
no longer lead evidence of a prompt report unless the defence raises the issue
of delay, and juries must not be instructed that delayed reporting tells against
the complainant's credibility. 117 Beyond that, the effect of the amendment was
unclear. The spare statutory language left open whether evidence of delayed
reporting was admissible and what inferences could be drawn from it.
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed issues of delay in R v DD, which
involved a delayed disclosure of sexual abuse by a child complainant. '55 The trial
judge admitted expert evidence from a child psychologist, who testified that
delay said nothing either way about the truth of an allegation. By a majority,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the psychologist's evidence should have
been excluded as unnecessary because the proposition he advanced could be
communicated in a jury instruction. The majority suggested that that juries be
instructed as follows:
there is no inviolable rule on how people who are the victims
of trauma like a sexual assault will behave. Some will make
an immediate complaint, some will delay in disclosing the
abuse, while some will never disclose the abuse. Reasons for
delay are many and at least include embarrassment, fear,
guilt, or a lack of understanding and knowledge. In assessing
the credibility of a complainant, the timing of the complaint
153. See ibid at 579.
154. See Statistics Canada, supra note 73 at 17 (five per cent of sexual assaults reported
to police in 2014); Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149 at 557 (disincentives make
delayed reporting likely).
155. Kribs, supra note 150 at 405.
156. See supra note 5. Section 275 provides that, in respect of sexual offence,, "[t]he rules
relating to evidence of recent complaint are hereby abrogated" (ibid, s275).
157. See R v O'Connor (1995), 25 OR (3d) 19, 100 CCC (3d) 285 (CA) (Crown no longer
permitted to bring evidence of recent complaint); Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149
at 559.
158. 2000 SCC 43.
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is simply one circumstance to consider in the factual mosaic
of a particular case. A delay in disclosure, standing alone, will
never give rise to an adverse inference against the credibility
of the complainant."'
Arguably, the message contained in this jury instruction differs subtly from the
psychologist's testimony.'6' While the expert could be understood as suggesting
that delay was irrelevant (because it said nothing either way about the truth of
the allegation), the Supreme Court of Canada stopped short of indicating that
delay is irrelevant to credibility. Instead, the majority held that delay means
nothing "standing alone", but that it is "one circumstance to consider in the
factual mosaic of a particular case"."'
If delayed reporting remains a circumstance to be considered, what inferences
from this evidence remain open after DD? The qualification that delay means
nothing "standing alone" might be read as an invitation to view delay as a factor
that weighs against credibility where unrelated factors pointing to a lack of
credibility are also present. 112 However, Professor Craig has persuasively argued
that DD should be interpreted as prohibiting entirely the inference that delay
is generally damaging to credibility."I On this view, rejecting the generalization
that true victims disclose promptly means that delay can only be used to
undermine credibility when there is something in the factual circumstances
suggesting that the individual complainant would likely have made a prompt
report.114
C. A Balancing Approach to Eliminating Myths
Canadian law on sexual history evidence and delayed disclosure reveals
a consistent approach to removing myths and stereotypes from the sexual
assault adjudication. Since relevance is contextual and, subject to the rules
of evidence, the Charter requires that the defence generally be permitted to
lead relevant evjdence,'65 the Supreme Court of Canada has avoided sweeping
159.Ibid at pata65.

160. I am grateful to David Lepofsky for this insight.
161.R v DD,supra note 158 at para 65.
162. Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149 at 565-68; R v HT, 2009 NLCA 69 at
para 7.
163. See Craig, "Delayed Disclosure", supra note 149 at 564.
164. See ibid.
165. For discussion of the law', inclusionary inclination in respect of relevant defence evidence
and its relationship to the accused's fair trial rights under the Charter, see generally Seaboyer,
supra note 4. For further discussion of Seaboyer, see also supra note, 22-25 and accompanying
text.
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pronouncements about relevance and admissibility. Suggestions that sexual
history evidence or delayed disclosure are always irrelevant or inadmissible,
in general or in relation to particular issues like credibility or consent, have
been rejected. Instead, the law prohibits stereotypical or discriminatory lines
of reasoning flowing from these forms of evidence, but acknowledges that they
may be relevant for other, legitimate inferential purposes.
I would argue that Canadian courts should maintain this approach in
addressing other myths and stereotypes about sexual assault. Broad conclusions
that particular forms of evidence are irrelevant should be avoided. Instead,
false premises and discriminatory lines of reasoning should be identified
and explicitly prohibited. Identifying the impermissible lines of reasoning
will permit judges to distinguish them from legitimate lines of reasoning. In
short, myths and stereotypes about sexual assault are properly understood as
prohibited inferences, and the tendency of some forms of evidence to invite
these prohibited inferences is a form of prejudice.'66 That prejudice can lead to
exclusion of the evidence, but it will not invariably do so if the evidence is also
relevant for some other purpose.
The exercise of weighing the permissible and impermissible uses of evidence
is familiar in evidence law. 117 Evidence solely relevant to support a prohibited
inference has no legitimate probative value and is inadmissible. Evidence that
could support an impermissible inference but that also logically supports
some legitimate line of reasoning is normally admissible subject to a limiting
instruction."' Following Seaboyer, a trial judge will exercise discretion to
exclude evidence where, despite any limiting instruction, its potential to be used
for the prohibited purpose outweighs (or, for defence evidence, substantially
outweighs) its legitimate probative value.
Admittedly, the flexible approach to admissibility described here may not
be as effective as bright-line rules in rooting out myths and stereotypes from
sexual assault trials. For example, blanket exclusion of sexual history evidence
or evidence of delayed complaint would undoubtedly do more to prevent
improper uses of these forms of evidence. If the evidence could not be used at
all, there would be no concerns about its being used to support discriminatory
or stereotypical inferences. However, Canadian law has rejected such bright-line

166. See Hami,h Stewart, "Marc Rosenberg and the Implied Fairness Guarantee" in Berger,
Cunliffe & Stribopoulous, supra note 8, 13 (stating that "arguably [the] most important.
type of prejudicial effect is the danger of admitting evidence which. tends to encourage the
drawing of impermissible inferences" at 25).
167. See e.g. Seaboyer, supra note 4 at 609.
168. See R v Corbett, supra note 18 ("best way to balance.., is to give the jury all the
information, but at the same time give a clear direction as to the limited use they are to make
of such information" at 691).
.
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rules and embraced a flexible, context-sensitive approach to relevance and
admissibility for good reasons. This approach remains the only way to ensure
that the defence has access to relevant evidence for legitimate purposes.161
Examples where courts have successfully identified and rejected myths and
stereotypes can be drawn from cases involving evidence about complainants'
attire. Often, evidence of the complainant's manner of dress has no relevance at
all outside the prohibited inferences that provocative attire impairs credibility
or invites sexual activity. Thus, in R v Cain, the Court of Appeal of Alberta
rejected a defence claim that the complainant's credibility was damaged because
she allegedly wore a t-shirt with an image of a penis on it shortly after the
alleged sexual assault. 171 The Court held that the complainant's "manner of
dress was irrelevant to her credibility. By suggesting otherwise, defence counsel
was relying on long-discredited myths and stereotypes about women deserving
to be raped because they dress provocatively.""'
Even where the complainant's manner of dress has some relevance for a
legitimate purpose, courts can be careful to separate the permissible and
impermissible purposes of the evidence. In Nyznik, for example, Molloy J
addressed the complainant's attire in the reasons for judgment:
There was nothing at all wrong with what [the complainant]
was wearing that night. In cross-examination, defence counsel
suggested to her that she wore a low-cut top in order to make
herself attractive to all the men who would be present at the
party. I found that suggestion to be offensive and irrelevant.
What a woman wears is no indication of her willingness to
have sexual intercourse, nor can it be seen as even the remotest
justification for assuming she is consenting to sex.171
Nevertheless, Molloy J held that the complainant's attire was relevant for two
legitimate purposes. Her willingness to stand outside in the freezing cold in
light clothing was an indication of her strong interest in spending time with
one of the accused, and her ability to walk in high-heeled boots shortly before
the alleged sexual assault had probative value on her level of intoxication and
capacity. 171 Nyznik was a judge-alone trial, but this approach to separating the
169. Recall that in Seaboyer, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that blanket exclusion
of sexual history evidence violated the accused's fair trial rights under the Charter because it
could have the effect of excluding critical defence evidence that was relevant for legitimate, nondiscriminatory inferential purposes. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
170. Supra note 6.
171.Ibidarpara30.

note 40 at para 188.
See
ibid.
173.
172.Supra
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legitimate and prohibited uses of the evidence could also be followed in a jury
trial. Juries can be instructed on the permissible and impermissible inferences
from evidence and warned to avoid the latter. Moreover, defence evidence about
the complainant's attire could be excluded if its potential to invite prohibited
reasoning substantially outweighed its probative value for legitimate inferential
purposes.
Notice that this entire analysis depends on achieving a clear understanding
of the lines of reasoning that are prohibited. Myths and stereotypes must
be identified with precision. Absent a clear understanding of the prohibited
inferences, judges will be unable to instruct juries (or themselves) to avoid
them. 114 They will also be ill equipped to meaningfully balance the probative
value of evidence against its prejudicial effect. Clarity in identifying and
articulating myths and stereotypes about sexual assault is therefore fundamental
to the task of separating these prohibited lines of reasoning from legitimate
inferences and making those distinctions meaningful in the adjudication of
sexual assault cases. As we will see in the next part of this paper, this clarity has
not always been achieved.

Subsequent Relationship wit

f
-

Accused

Courts have struggled to define the permissible and impermissible uses of
the complainant's after-the-fact conduct, and particularly the complainant's
relationship with the accused after the alleged sexual assault. This issue arose in
R v Ghomeshi, where the three complainants claimed that the accused suddenly
and without consent subjected them to violent force in a sexual context while
they were on dates. 171 All three complainants continued to socialize with the
accused after the alleged assaults: each went on at least one further date with
him, each sent him flirtatious correspondence inviting further contact, one had
sexual contact with him, and another sent him flowers and an email less than
a day after the alleged assault indicating a desire to have sex with him. The
trial judge acquitted the accused on all counts, finding that the complainants
174. See e.g. R v Barton, supra note 7. The trial judge appears to have overlooked the
prejudicial effects that could flow from the facts that the deceased was an Indigenous woman
who was intoxicated and engaged in sex work. The Court of Appeal of Alberta noted that, given
the prevalence of discriminatory stereotypes about Indigenous women, "without a sufficient
direction to the jury, the risk that this jury might simply have assumed that Barton's money
bought [the deceased] Gladue's consent to whatever he wanted to do was very real, indeed
inescapable" (ibid at para 128). The trial judge's failure to instruct the jury to avoid such
stereotyping was an error of law.
175. Supra note 3.
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were not reliable witnesses primarily because they each misstated facts in
testimony or police statements. In determining that the complainants were
not credible and reliable witnesses, Horkins J also put some weight on the
complainants' continued associations with the accused, which he found "out of
harmony with the assaultive behaviour" alleged.176 It is not clear whether this
line of reasoning is open to a judge under Canadian law.
Canadian courts have rejected as a myth the idea that real victims of sexual
assault do not continue to associate with the perpetrator. 177 In R v CAM, the
trial judge convicted the accused of sexual assault and related offences against
his ex-wife.'7' On appeal, the defence argued that it was unusual "for rape
victims to invite perpetrators back into the house and console them (which
was the complainant's evidence) 11.171 Writing for the unanimous Manitoba
Court of Appeal, Mainella JA rejected as "unsound" the defence argument the
complainant's credibility was damaged because her actions "did not conform
to some 'idealized standard of conduct"'."' This holding accords with the
principle affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in DD that "there is no
inviolable rule on how people who are the victims of trauma like a sexual assault
will behave"."' These cases suggest that triers of fact fall into error when they
rely on rigid, general expectations about how victims act in the aftermath of a
sexual assault.
In R v ARJD, the trial judge acquitted the accused of sexual offences against
his step-daughter when she was between eleven and sixteen years of age.182 In
acquitting the accused, the trial judge made comments that were scrutinized on
appeal and are worth quoting in full:
I do not discount the complainant's credibility because she
delayed complaint or because she did not cry out or search
out help from her mother or other family members. To judge
her credibility against those myths of appropriate behaviour
is not helpful. The supposed expected behaviour of the usual
victim tells me nothing about this particular victim.

176. Ibiclat paras 135-36.
177. See R v Caesar, supra note 91 at para 6; Bernatchez cR, 2013 QCCA 700 at para 18.
178. 2017MBCA70.
179. Ibiclat para 47.
180. Ibid at para 52.
181. Supra note 158 at para 65.
182. (23 February 2016), Edmonton 140876020Q1 (A1taQB), rev'd 2017ABCA 237 [ARID
ABCA], rev'd 2018 SCC 6 [ARID SCC].
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Having said all of that, however, given the length of time that
these events occurred over, and the fact that the most serious
event occurred months before [the complainant] complained,
I would have expected some evidence of avoidance either
conscious or unconscious. There was no such evidence. As a
matter of logic and common sense, one would expect that
a victim of sexual abuse would demonstrate behaviours
consistent with that abuse or at least some change of behaviour
such as avoiding the perpetrator. While I recognize that
everyone does not react in the same way, the evidence suggests
that despite these alleged events the relationship between the
accused and the complainant was an otherwise normal parent/
child relationship. That incongruity is significant enough to
leave me in doubt about these allegations."I
The trial judge thus acquitted solely on the basis of the lack of evidence that the
complainant avoided the accused.
The Court of Appeal of Alberta split over whether the trial judge's
comments amounted to a legal error. The majority overturned the acquittal,
finding that the trial judge relied on an impermissible stereotype when he
judged the complainant's evidence against a general expectation that a sexual
abuse victim would avoid the perpetrator. The majority held that "absence of
avoidant behaviour or a change in behaviour as a generalization is logically
irrelevant and as such, cannot form the basis of a credibility assessment leading
to reasonable doubt—because we know that all sexual assault victims behave
differently"."4 In dissent, Slatter JA concluded that the trial judge was not
relying on a myth but drawing a permissible inference about the credibility of a
particular complainant in a particular factual context."' An appeal by right to
the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed, in brief reasons,
substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of
Appeal. In considering the lack of evidence of the complainant's
avoidance of the appellant, the trial judge committed the very
error he had earlier in his reasons instructed himself against:
he judged the complainant's credibility based solely on the
correspondence between her behaviour and the expected

183. ARID ABCA, supra note 182 at para 82 [emphasis omitted] (quoting the trial judge's
reason,).
184. Aid at para 58, Paperny & SchutzJjA.
185. See ibid at para 98, Slatter JA, dissenting.
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behaviour of the stereotypical victim of sexual assault. This
constituted an error of law."'
ARID confirms that upholding rigid, generalized expectations about the
behaviour of sexual assault victims constitutes impermissible stereotyping. That
was a point of agreement for all the appellate judges.187 The conclusion that the
trial judge engaged in such stereotyping also appears defensible on the facts,
since the trial judge articulated a broad and questionable generalization about
how "one would expect that a victim of sexual abuse" would behave.'88
What seems less clear after ARJD is whether and when evidence of
complainants' after-the-fact conduct is admissible and what legitimate inferences
it can support. The majority in the Court of Appeal of Alberta used strong
language in holding that a complainant's non-avoidance of the perpetrator says
"nothing" about a sexual assault allegation and is "logically irrelevant"."' One
might read these comments as suggesting that a complainant's after-the-fact
conduct in relation to the accused is generally (or even always) irrelevant and
inadmissible, or that no inferences favourable to the defence can be drawn
from it. The latter suggestion is problematic because, as pointed out by Slatter
JA in dissent at the Court of Appeal of Alberta, evidence of the complainant's
avoidant behaviour is frequently admitted to support the Crown's case in sexual
assault prosecutions.'90 It hardly seems consistent with the presumption of
innocence to hold that a particular species of evidence can be admissible when
it assists the Crown but inadmissible when it assists the defence.'9'
Moreover, the idea that the complainant's after-the-fact conduct is
inadmissible conflicts with the Supreme Court of Canada's usual approach
to eliminating myths and stereotypes about sexual assault, as discussed in
the previous section. That approach does not involve prejudging categories
of evidence irrelevant. It would be more faithful to the Supreme Court of
Canada's approach in other areas to acknowledge, like the dissent in ARID, that
prohibiting rigid expectations about how sexual assault victims behave does

186. ARJD SCC, supra note 182 at para 2.
187. See ARID ABCA, supra note 182 (dissent disapproving "presumptions about how sexual
assault victims, as a whole, should react" at para 97).

188.Ibid at para 5.
189.Aid at paras 39, 58.

190. See ibid at para 96.
191. See ibid (noting that "[i]f actual behavioural changes of the complainant can be evidence
of sexual assault, the absence of such behavioural changes must also be probative" at para 96,
Slatter TA, dissenting). It is worth noting that Canadian courts have taken a broad view of
the relevance of the after-the-fact conduct of accused in criminal cases generally. See e.g. R v
Cameo, 2019 SCC 6 (where the accused's elaborate efforts to destroy his domestic partner's
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not preclude inferences from the complainant's after-the-fact conduct that are
rooted in the specific factual context.192
The complainant's after-the-fact conduct was found to have legitimate
probative value in R v LS.193 In that case, the Court of Appeal for Ontario
ruled admissible evidence that an ongoing sexual relationship between the
accused and the complainant continued as if nothing had happened after an
alleged sexual assault. Writing for the Court, Doherty JA concluded that the
evidence was relevant to support the inference suggested by the defence that
"the parties carried on as if nothing had happened because nothing had in fact
happened" and the alleged sexual assault never occurred.' Justice Doherty
acknowledged that people's reactions vary and that it would be wrong to
conclude that the unchanged relationship "demonstrated that the assault did
not occur".'95 He observed, however, that relevance is a low standard that does
not require the evidence to be determinative. LS thus suggests that, in some
cases, the impermissible line of reasoning involves not just using the evidence
but exaggerating its probative value.
Canadian law rejects stereotyping about the expected behaviour of sexual
assault victims: victims do not follow a standard script, and courts cannot
reason as if they do. To this point, however, Canadian law remains somewhat
uncertain about where to draw the line between impermissible stereotypes
and legitimate inferences from complainants' after-the-fact conduct. The
cases suggest that while impermissible inferences are based on generalized
expectations of victims, legitimate inferences will be rooted in the particular
facts of the case.'96 Legitimate inferences are also likely to be modest: a claim
that after-the-fact conduct is relevant may be defensible where a claim that
it is determinative is not. Indeed, the idea the complainant's after-the-fact
conduct is determinative—such that, for example, a woman who maintains
a relationship with the accused cannot have been assaulted—constitutes a
mythical line of reasoning that juries should be warned against, even if the
evidence is understood as relevant. Given these complexities, evidence of the

body were determined to be relevant both to whether her death was an accident or homicide
and to whether the homicide was manslaughter or murder).
192. See ARID ABCA, supra note 182 (noting that "[p]ost-event behaviour is relevant and
probative, even if all complainants do not react the same way" at para 98).
193. 20170NCA685.
194. Aid arpara 88.
195. Ibid at para 89.
196. This suggestion accords with the principle that findings of fact must be based on casespecific evidence and not generalizations, which the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in R
vS(RD). See [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193.
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complainant's relationship with the accused after the alleged assault remains
a challenging issue for Canadian courts. The analysis would be advanced by a
clearer authoritative statement of the inferences that are prohibited.

Distinguishing myths and stereotypes from legitimate lines of reasoning
continues to be a challenge for Canadian courts. Judges cannot be expected
to manage this task well and consistently unless the prohibited inferences are
identified with clarity. As we have seen, there are areas in Canadian law—
including the twin myths prohibited under subsection 276(1) and the use of
evidence of the complainant's after-the-fact conduct—where this precision
remains elusive. One hopes that appellate courts will provide leadership in
bringing clarity to this important area of evidence law.

[Stsiitsi rrrin

Eliminating myths and stereotypes from the adjudication of sexual assault
cases is and should be a high priority for Canadian courts. Misguided beliefs
about sexual assault skew the fact finding process, and reliance on those beliefs
by judges and lawyers is one reason many experience and perceive courtrooms
as a hostile environment for sexual assault complainants.197 Enhanced social
awareness of the pervasiveness of sexual violence and the impunity many
perpetrators enjoy, coupled with compelling critiques of the Canadian legal
response to that violence,"' have undermined confidence in the criminal justice
system more broadly. In this climate courts must make every effort to ensure
that the sexual assault cases that come before them are adjudicated without
resort to misconceptions and discriminatory lines of reasoning.
Criminal courts also carry the heavy responsibility of ensuring that
every accused person has a fair trial. Subject to the rules of evidence and the
prohibition of particular inferences, this requires that the defence generally
be permitted to bring forward all evidence that is logically relevant to the
material issues. Repudiating myths and stereotypes means rejecting certain
discriminatory lines of reasoning, but it does not make whole categories of
evidence irrelevant or inadmissible. Indeed, sweeping prohibitions that would
rule out any consideration of particular forms of evidence are avoided as
inconsistent with the accused's right to make full answer and defence and with
our overall approach to finding facts. Outside the prohibited lines of reasoning
identified as myths, relevance remains an elastic concept that leaves a wide
scope for reasoning from logic and human experience.'99
197. See Elaine Craig, "The Inhospitable Court" (2016) 66:2 UTLJ 197.
198. See e.g. Craig, Trials on Trial, supra note 8.
199. As the Court of Appeal of Alberta recently put it:
[A] stereotypical myth about sexual assault complainants is a form of
prohibited reasoning and cannot be relied upon by triers of fact. However,
triers of fact are entitled, indeed are required, to rely on common sense
and human experience in assessing evidence and the credibility of witnesses,
including reasonable assumptions about how ordinary people can be
expected to act.
Re PFJ, 2018 ABCA 322 at para 14.
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